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Avoiding a Confrontation? 
HOW COURTS HAVE ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY IS BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF THE BRUTON DOCTRINE 
Colin Miller† 
INTRODUCTION 
Quite obviously, what the “interlocking” nature of the codefendant’s 
confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability: 
If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant’s own 
confession it is more likely to be true. Its reliability . . . may be 
relevant to whether the confession should . . . be admitted as 
evidence against the defendant . . . but cannot conceivably be 
relevant to whether, assuming it cannot be admitted, the jury is 
likely to obey the instruction to disregard it, or the jury’s failure to 
obey is likely to be inconsequential. The law cannot command 
respect if such an inexplicable exception to a supposed constitutional 
imperative is adopted. Having decided Bruton, we must face the 
honest consequences of what it holds.1 
George Bruton and William Evans were jointly tried 
before a jury on a bank robbery charge.2 After Evans was 
arrested, he confessed to a postal inspector that Bruton and he 
had committed the robbery.3 Although Evans did not testify at 
trial, the prosecution introduced his confession against him.4 
Because the confession was hearsay as to Bruton—and 
therefore inadmissible against him under the rules of 
evidence—the court instructed the jury to use it only as 
evidence of Evans’s guilt.5 Despite the instruction, the United 
States Supreme Court could not trust the jury to use the 
† Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School; Blog Editor, 
EvidenceProf Blog (http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof). I would like to 
thank James Duane, Jules Epstein, George Fisher, Richard Friedman, James Kainen, 
Richard Lempert, Frederick Moss, and Ben Trachtenberg for their comments on the 
issue addressed by the article. 
1 Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1987). 
2 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 125. 
5 Id. 
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confession against Evans and not against Bruton. The confession 
had a devastating practical effect on Bruton’s defense, and the 
Court found that admitting it violated his constitutional rights.6 
Courts now use this “Bruton doctrine” to conclude that the 
admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s 
confession that facially incriminates other defendants (but is 
inadmissible against them under the rules of evidence) violates 
the Confrontation Clause.7 
But what if Evans did not make his statement to a 
person he knew to be a governmental agent? What if he made 
the same statement to his mother, his brother, or his lover? Or 
what if he made the same statement to his cellmate, who 
turned out to be a confidential informant? Before 2004, the vast 
majority of courts would have found that the admission of such 
a “noncustodial” statement violated the Bruton doctrine. 
Furthermore, before 2004, it would have been irrelevant 
whether Evans’s confession was constitutionally reliable as 
long as it was inadmissible against Bruton under the rules of 
evidence. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the 
admission of hearsay did not violate the Confrontation Clause 
if the hearsay declarant was “unavailable” and the statement 
had “adequate indicia of reliability” (i.e., if it was 
constitutionally reliable).8 As the introductory excerpt from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Cruz v. New York makes clear, 
however, the Bruton doctrine is a test of constitutional 
harmfulness and not a test of constitutional reliability.9 In 
other words, Bruton focuses upon the damage to a defendant’s 
case based upon the admission of his codefendant’s statement, 
not the (un)reliability of that statement. Therefore, the 
doctrine depends on the inadmissibility of codefendant 
confessions combined with their harmfulness, not their 
constitutional unreliability.10 Consequently, codefendant 
confessions that were inadmissible but reliable under Roberts 
still violated the Bruton doctrine.11  
  
 6 Id. at 128-36. 
 7 See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1987) (“To invoke the 
Bruton doctrine, a statement must be powerfully and facially incriminating with 
respect to the other defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate the 
complaining defendant in the commission of the crime.”). 
 8 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 9 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 10 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 11 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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In its 2004 opinion in Crawford v. Washington, the 
Supreme Court overruled Roberts, rejecting its reliability 
analysis and holding that “[w]here testimonial statements are 
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy 
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.”12 And while the Supreme Court is 
still sorting out exactly which statements are “testimonial” and 
which statements are “nontestimonial,” three things are clear. 
First, statements like Evans’s confession to the postal inspector 
are generally testimonial while statements to a mother, 
brother, lover, or confidential informant generally are not.13  
Second, with limited exceptions, only the admission of 
testimonial hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause.14 Third, 
courts presented with the issue have consistently concluded 
(again, with few exceptions15) that nontestimonial hearsay now 
falls outside the scope of the Bruton doctrine, with many of these 
opinions handed down in 2010.16 Thus, in its 2010 opinion in 
United States v. Dale, the Eighth Circuit could easily conclude 
that the admission at a joint jury trial of a codefendant’s 
unwitting confession to a confidential informant did not violate 
the Bruton doctrine because it was nontestimonial.17  
These courts, however, are missing something 
apparently less clear about Crawford. Like its predecessor, 
Ohio v. Roberts, it should have had no effect on the Bruton 
doctrine. Because Crawford, like Roberts, sets forth a test for 
constitutional reliability, it has no bearing on the Bruton 
doctrine, which sets forth a test for constitutional harmfulness. 
It is thus easy to see why the Crawford Court concluded that in 
Cruz it answered an “entirely different question” than the one 
before it: the Bruton doctrine “make[s] no claim to be a 
surrogate means of assessing reliability.”18 
This article argues that courts have erred in concluding 
that nontestimonial statements are beyond the scope of the 
Bruton doctrine in the wake of Crawford. Therefore, a 
  
 12 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004). 
 13 See id. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government 
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.”). 
 14 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (“It is the testimonial 
character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to 
traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”). 
 15 See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 266-80 and accompanying text. 
 17 614 F.3d 942, 956 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
 18 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 62. 
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codefendant’s confession to a mother, brother, or lover should 
violate the Bruton doctrine to the same extent as a formal 
codefendant confession to a governmental agent. Moreover, this 
article asserts that even if Crawford did deconstitutionalize the 
Bruton doctrine with regard to nontestimonial statements, 
rendering these statements beyond the scope of the doctrine, 
courts should still find that the admission of nontestimonial 
statements by codefendants violates Federal Rule of Evidence 
403 because their probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Part I tracks the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
Confrontation Clause before Crawford, including the Court’s 
creation and refinement of the Bruton doctrine. Part II discusses 
Crawford, its progeny, and the testimonial/nontestimonial 
dichotomy created by the Court. Part III addresses the ways in 
which lower courts have interpreted and applied the Bruton 
doctrine both before Crawford and in its wake. Finally, Part IV 
of this article concludes that courts should find that Crawford 
had no effect on the Bruton doctrine, meaning that the 
admission of nontestimonial codefendant statements can still 
violate the Bruton doctrine. Further, even if the admission of 
nontestimonial statements by codefendants does not violate the 
Confrontation Clause, the admission still clearly violates the 
rules of evidence. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S PRE-CRAWFORD CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE CASES 
A. The Road to the Bruton Doctrine 
 Conceptually, the Bruton doctrine represents the 
convergence of two distinct lines of analysis. The first 
line flows from the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause, guaranteeing the right of defendants in criminal 
prosecutions to confront adverse witnesses. The second 
line flows from courts’ distrust in juries’ ability to 
disregard information they have already seen and 
heard. 
 1. The Confrontation Clause 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
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him.”19 In Douglas v. Alabama, the Court applied and expanded 
that right in holding that the introduction of a nontestifying 
coparticipant’s statement may violate the Sixth Amendment 
where the defendant does not have the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant about these inculpatory statements.20 
The Douglas holding is particularly strong since the confession 
at issue was introduced to the jury but not actually admitted 
into evidence against the defendant. 
In Douglas, Jesse Douglas and Olen Loyd were charged 
with assault with intent to murder and given separate trials.21 
Loyd’s trial was held first, and he was convicted.22 Before Loyd 
was sentenced, the prosecutor called him to testify at Douglas’s 
trial, but Loyd attempted to invoke his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.23 The trial judge precluded 
Loyd from invoking this privilege because he had already been 
convicted, but Loyd persisted in refusing to testify.24 Then, 
under the guise of attempting to refresh Loyd’s recollection, the 
prosecutor read the entirety of a confession allegedly made by 
Loyd, which in part named Douglas as the person who fired the 
shot that struck the victim.25 Three law enforcement officers 
thereafter identified the confession as one made and signed by 
Loyd, but the confession was not officially offered into 
evidence.26 Although Loyd’s confession was not technically 
admitted into evidence, it is clear that the jury used it in 
convicting Douglas. 
The Supreme Court found that Douglas’s inability to 
cross-examine Loyd regarding this “alleged confession plainly 
denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the 
Confrontation Clause.”27 According to the Court, while the 
prosecutor’s “reading of Loyd’s alleged statement, and Loyd’s 
refusal to answer, were not technically testimony, the 
[prosecutor’s] reading may well have been the equivalent in the 
jury’s mind of testimony that Loyd in fact made the 
statement . . . .”28 Therefore, “Loyd’s reliance on privilege 
  
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 20 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965). 
 21 Id. at 416. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 416-17. 
 26 Id. at 417. 
 27 Id. at 419. 
 28 Id. 
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created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer 
both that the statement had been made and that it was true.”29 
The Court held that “effective confrontation of Loyd was 
only possible if Loyd affirmed the statement as his” and that 
Loyd instead invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and did 
not expose himself to cross-examination.30  
 2. In Jury We Trust: Delli Paoli and the Efficacy of 
Jury Instructions 
A limiting instruction is a direction the judge gives to 
the jury, instructing its members not to use certain evidence 
for an improper purpose. Whether jurors actually do (or even 
mentally can) abide by these limiting instructions is 
fundamental to the rationale underlying the Bruton doctrine. 
When the Supreme Court first addressed the issue, it placed a 
great deal of trust in jurors’ ability to heed limiting 
instructions. For instance, the 1957 case Delli Paoli v. United 
States31 underscored the notion that jurors will follow a court’s 
clear instructions.32 As the Court’s opinion in Delli Paoli makes 
clear, courts historically applied this premise in cases where 
judges instructed jurors in joint trials to use only nontestifying 
codefendants’ confessions as evidence of their guilt—not as 
evidence against other defendants.  
In Delli Paoli, Orlando Delli Paoli was tried jointly with 
four codefendants on charges of conspiracy to deal unlawfully 
in alcohol.33 One of those codefendants, James Whitley, signed a 
written confession after the conspiracy was over that also 
implicated Delli Paoli.34 The district court admitted Whitley’s 
confession but emphatically instructed the jury to use the 
confession only in determining Whitley’s guilt and not the guilt 
of the other defendants.35 The Court explained that the 
confession was hearsay and therefore inadmissible against the 
other defendants. However, since the confession was considered 
an admission against Whitley’s penal interest (an exception to 
the hearsay rule) the Court allowed the confession with the 
instruction that the jury should use it against Whitley only, 
  
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 352 U.S. 232 (1957). 
 32 See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 33 352 U.S. at 233. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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and not against Delli Paoli. In addressing this issue, the Court 
first noted that if the facts were somewhat different, it would 
have been clear that there was no evidentiary error.36 First, if 
Whitley’s confession did not implicate Delli Paoli in the 
conspiracy, its admission would not have been objectionable.37 
Second, if the district court admitted the confession but deleted 
all reference to Delli Paoli, it clearly would have been 
admissible.38 Third, if Whitley’s statement were made in 
furtherance of the subject conspiracy, it would have constituted 
a coconspirator admission and been admissible against all 
codefendants.39 As noted, though, Whitley made his confession 
after the conspiracy was over, meaning that his confession was 
“nothing more than hearsay evidence” and thus inadmissible 
against his codefendants.40 
The Court’s decision about whether to affirm Delli 
Paoli’s conviction hinged on whether the jury followed the 
district court’s limiting instruction and used Whitley’s 
confession as evidence of only his guilt.41 The Court concluded 
that it did. This was based not so much upon an actual belief 
that the jurors did as they were told as it was upon the fear that 
a contrary conclusion would mean that the very concept of trial 
by jury would need to be abandoned. According to the Court, 
It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the law to 
the jury and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the jury finds 
them. Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the 
court’s instructions where those instructions are clear and the 
circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be expected to 
follow them, the jury system makes little sense. Based on faith that 
the jury will endeavor to follow the court’s instructions, our system of 
jury trial has produced one of the most valuable and practical 
mechanisms in human experience for dispensing substantial justice.42 
While the Court acknowledged that there may be some 
cases where such blind faith should not be placed in the jury’s 
ability to respect limiting instructions, it found that the case before 
it was not one of them and affirmed Delli Paoli’s conviction.43  
  
 36 Id. at 237. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. According to the Court, “The impracticality of such deletion was, 
however, agreed to by both the trial court and the entire court below and cannot well 
be controverted.” Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 240. 
 41 Id. at 241-43. 
 42 Id. at 242. 
 43 Id. at 243. 
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter expressed 
doubt that jurors had the ability to “put out of their minds” 
evidence that they had already seen and heard. Jackson wrote, 
“The Government should not have the windfall of having the 
jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a 
matter of law, they should not consider but which they cannot 
put out of their minds.”44 Eleven years later, in the 1968 case 
Bruton v. United States, the Court would agree with Justice 
Frankfurter and lose trust in the jury’s ability to respect 
limiting instructions.45 
 3. In Jury We Doubt: The Court’s Loss of Faith in the 
Jury 
In its 1964 opinion Jackson v. Denno, the Court relied in 
part on Jackson’s Delli Paoli dissent in expressing its distrust 
in jurors’ ability to disregard involuntary confessions.46 Jackson 
considered the constitutionality of a New York rule under 
which a defendant’s confession was given to jurors rather than 
the judge to determine its voluntariness, with the judge 
instructing jurors to disregard the confession entirely if they 
determined that it was involuntary.47 In resolving this issue, 
the Court posed the following questions:  
Under the New York procedure, the fact of a defendant’s confession is 
solidly implanted in the jury’s mind, for it has not only heard the 
confession, but it has been instructed to consider and judge its 
voluntariness and is in position to assess whether it is true or false. If 
it finds the confession involuntary, does the jury—indeed, can it—then 
disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions[?] If there 
are lingering doubts about the sufficiency of the other evidence, does 
the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the confession? 
Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of the other evidence to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt actually result in acquittal when the 
jury knows the defendant has given a truthful confession?48  
The Court noted the folly of this venture, finding that 
“[i]t is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession 
which a jury has found to be involuntary has nevertheless 
influenced the verdict or that its finding of voluntariness, if 
this is the course it took, was affected by the other evidence 
  
 44 Id. at 248 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 45 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
 46  378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
 47 Id. at 374. 
 48 Id. at 388. 
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showing the confession was true.”49 For the Court, though, this 
uncertainty was enough for it to conclude that New York’s rule 
contravened the defendant’s rights under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the rule “pose[d] 
substantial threats to a defendant’s constitutional rights to 
have an involuntary confession entirely disregarded.”50  
The Supreme Court in 1966 amended Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 14, which authorized courts to sever 
defendants’ trials if consolidation appeared to prejudice the 
government or the defendants.51 The amendment added a 
clause to Rule 14, which provided that “[i]n ruling on a motion 
by a defendant for severance the court may order the 
government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any 
statements or confessions made by the defendants which the 
government intends to introduce in evidence at trial.”52 The 
accompanying Advisory Committee’s Note elucidated the 
amendment’s rationale: “A defendant may be prejudiced by the 
admission in evidence against a codefendant of a statement or 
confession made by that codefendant. This prejudice cannot be 
dispelled by cross-examination if the codefendant does not take 
the stand. Limiting instructions to the jury may not in fact 
erase the prejudice.”53  
Together, the above actions undermined the holding in 
Delli Paoli—that courts can trust jurors to respect limiting 
instructions when codefendant confessions are introduced at 
joint jury trials. The Court would later expressly recognize this 
notion in Bruton. 
B. The Bruton Doctrine 
In 1968, Bruton v. United States decisively overruled Delli 
Paoli, holding that the admission of certain codefendant 
confessions at joint jury trials violates the Confrontation Clause.54 
Several subsequent cases reveal that the Court does—and 
should—construe the Bruton doctrine as a test of constitutional 
harmfulness, not as a test of constitutional (un)reliability. 
In Bruton, George William Bruton and William James 
Evans were jointly tried on the federal charge of bank robbery, 
  
 49 Id. at 389. 
 50 Id. 
 51 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). 
 52 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(b). 
 53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1966 Amendment). 
 54 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
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and Evans did not testify at trial.55 After he was arrested, 
Evans gave a confession to a postal inspector in which he 
refused to name his accomplice, but he also gave another 
confession in which he admitted that Bruton and he committed 
the armed robbery at issue.56 As in Delli Paoli, the district court 
allowed the prosecution to introduce the latter confession and 
issued a limiting instruction informing the jury, among other 
things, that Evans’s confession was “hearsay insofar as the 
defendant George William Bruton is concerned, and you are not 
to consider it in any respect to the defendant Bruton, because 
insofar as he is concerned it is hearsay.”57 
Both Bruton and Evans were convicted, but their trial 
was actually held one week after the United States Supreme 
Court decided Miranda v. Arizona.58 On appeal, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Evans’s conviction upon 
finding that his confessions were inadmissible under Miranda 
because the interrogations that elicited the confessions were not 
accompanied by the requisite preliminary warnings.59 But 
because the district judge had instructed jurors not to use 
Evans’s confessions as evidence of Bruton’s guilt, the Second 
Circuit affirmed, assuming the jurors had heeded the instruction 
and had not used the improper confession against Bruton.60 
In analyzing the propriety of Bruton’s conviction, the 
Supreme Court began by restating Delli Paoli’s basic premise: 
“[I]t is reasonably possible for the jury to follow sufficiently clear 
instructions to disregard the confessor’s extrajudicial statement 
that his codefendant participated with him in committing the 
crime.”61 The Court then reiterated that “[i]f it were true that the 
jury disregarded the reference to the codefendant, no question 
would arise under the Confrontation Clause, because by 
hypothesis the case is treated as if the confessor made no 
statement inculpating the nonconfessor.”62 Ultimately, however, 
the Court found that it had effectively repudiated this basic 
premise through the previously mentioned actions.63 
  
 55 Id. at 124. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 125 n.2. 
 58 Id. at 124 n.1; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 59 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124. 
 60 Id. at 124-25. 
 61 Id. at 126 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)).  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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First, the Court stated that in Douglas it relied upon 
finding a Confrontation Clause violation when Loyd’s 
confession was read to the jury even though it was not 
technically admitted into evidence.64 The Court then noted that 
Evans’s confession implicating Bruton actually was introduced 
into evidence, which increased the likelihood that the jury 
would improperly use the confession as evidence of Bruton’s 
guilt.65 The Court thus found that Bruton’s inability to cross-
examine Evans, like Douglas’s inability to cross-examine Loyd, 
denied him his rights under the Confrontation Clause.66 
The Court next noted that while Jackson did not involve 
a codefendant’s confession, the Court relied in part upon 
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Delli Paoli to reject the 
proposition that a court can rely upon a jury to ignore a 
defendant’s confession after being asked to determine whether 
that confession was voluntary.67 The Court facilely agreed with 
the opinion of the Supreme Court of California in People v. 
Aranda, which had used Jackson to reject Delli Paoli’s premise 
that a court can rely upon a jury to not use a codefendant’s 
confession as evidence of the other defendant’s guilt.68 Indeed, 
the Court quoted Aranda for the proposition that “‘[i]f it is a 
denial of due process to rely on a jury’s presumed ability to 
disregard an involuntary confession, it may also be a denial of 
due process to rely on a jury’s presumed ability to disregard a 
codefendant’s confession implicating another defendant when it 
is determining that defendant’s guilt or innocence.’”69  
Then, after describing the import of the aforementioned 
amendment to Rule 14,70 the Court set forth and struck down 
several defenses to the procedure approved in Delli Paoli. First, 
the Court noted that Judge Learned Hand had argued that 
while a limiting instruction might not prevent a jury from 
using a codefendant’s confession as evidence of the other 
defendant’s guilt, the admission of such a confession along with 
a limiting instruction “‘probably furthers, rather than impedes, 
the search for truth.’”71 The Court found that this argument 
overlooked alternative ways of getting such a confession before 
  
 64 Id. at 126-27. 
 65 Id. at 127. 
 66 Id. at 127-28. 
 67 Id. at 128. 
 68 Id. at 130. 
 69 Id. (quoting People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72 (Cal. 1965)). 
 70 Id. at 131-32. 
 71 Id. at 133 (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)). 
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the jury without violating the nonconfessor’s right of 
confrontation, such as admitting the confession after redacting 
references to the nonconfessing codefendant.72  
Second, the Court cited the argument that it should 
maintain the rule of Delli Paoli because its abolishment would 
lead prosecutors to pursue separate trials and sacrifice the 
numerous benefits of joint trials.73 The Court again turned this 
argument aside, relying upon the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Fisher, 
which concluded that it could not sacrifice a defendant’s 
constitutional rights at the altar of greater convenience, 
economy, and speed in the administration of justice.74 
Third, the Court referenced its prior conclusion in Delli 
Paoli—that a contrary result would have required abolishing 
the very idea of trial by jury.75 The Court now regarded this 
pronouncement as hyperbolic, finding “that in many . . . cases 
the jury can and will follow the trial judge’s instructions to 
disregard” inadmissible evidence brought to its attention.76 In 
other cases, however, “as was recognized in Jackson v. 
Denno . . . the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital 
to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the 
jury system cannot be ignored.”77 And according to the Court, 
“Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully 
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who 
stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately 
spread before the jury in a joint trial.”78 In other words, when the 
prosecution has presented an entire case against a 
codefendant—including that codefendant’s confession, in which 
he claims that the defendant and he committed the crime—it is 
simply too much to ask the jury to disregard that confession as 
evidence of the other defendant’s guilt. 
The Court deemed such codefendant confessions 
devastating to other defendants.79 Accordingly, it held that 
“[d]espite the concededly clear instructions to the jury to 
disregard Evans’s inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating 
  
 72 Id. at 133-34 & n.10. 
 73 Id. at 134. 
 74 Id. at 134-35 (quoting People v. Fisher, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (N.Y. 1928)). 
 75 Id. at 135. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 135-36. 
 79 Id. at 136. 
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petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting 
instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner’s 
constitutional right of cross-examination.”80 The Court 
emphasized that it was the inadmissibility of Evans’s confession 
combined with this likelihood of harmfulness that led to the 
Confrontation Clause violation.81 The case did not present “any 
recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as [Bruton] is 
concerned and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions 
necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause.”82 
Courts later interpreted the Court’s opinion as creating 
the “Bruton doctrine,” under which the admission at a joint 
jury trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession that is 
inadmissible against other defendants under the rules of 
evidence violates the Confrontation Clause.83  
C. Harrington v. California and Harmless Error 
In Harrington v. California, the Court was presented 
with the question of whether violations of the Bruton doctrine 
automatically require reversal or whether they are subject to 
traditional harmless error analysis.84 In Harrington, three 
African-American men and one Caucasian man, Glen 
Harrington, were jointly tried before a jury on charges of 
attempted robbery and first-degree murder.85 Two of the 
African-American men gave confessions which also implicated 
“the white guy” or “the white boy.”86 These two codefendants did 
not testify at trial, but the prosecution did introduce their 
confessions, which were inadmissible against Harrington under 
the rules of evidence.87 The third African-American defendant 
did testify and implicated Harrington, and Harrington also 
testified and implicated himself.88 Moreover, other witnesses 
testified that Harrington had a gun and was an active 
participant in the attempted robbery.89 
  
 80 Id. at 137. 
 81 Id. at 128 n.3. 
 82 Id. 
 83 E.g., United States ex rel. Winsett v. Anderson, 456 F.2d 1197, 1198-99 (3d 
Cir. 1972). Later in 1968, the Supreme Court found in Roberts v. Russell that this new 
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Harrington was convicted, and the United States 
Supreme Court ultimately held that the admission of 
nontestifying codefendants’ confessions violated the Bruton 
doctrine.90 That said, the Court found that this Confrontation 
Clause violation was subject to harmless error review and 
determined that the trial court’s error was harmless in light of 
other overwhelming evidence of Harrington’s guilt.91 
D. Parker v. Randolph: The Court’s First Stab at 
Interlocking Confessions 
In Bruton, the Court found a Confrontation Clause 
violation in part because Evans’s confession had a 
“devastating” practical effect on Bruton’s defense.92 In its 1979 
opinion in Parker v. Randolph, the Court unsuccessfully 
attempted to answer the question of whether a codefendant’s 
confession could survive Confrontation Clause scrutiny if the 
prosecution could prove that its admission would not 
“devastate” the defenses of other defendants in a given case.93 
In Parker v. Randolph, several defendants were jointly tried 
before a jury in connection with a murder committed during a 
robbery, and none of the defendants testified.94 Each of the 
defendants made a confession to police officers that interlocked 
with the other defendants’ confessions—that is, they 
corroborated the other confessions.95 The trial court allowed the 
State to introduce each of these confessions and instructed 
jurors to use each defendant’s confession solely as evidence of 
his guilt because each confession was only admissible against 
the confessor under the rules of evidence.96  
In finding that the Sixth Circuit improperly granted 
habeas relief to one of the defendants convicted after this joint 
trial, the United States Supreme Court concluded in a four 
Justice plurality opinion “that admission of interlocking 
confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the 
requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.”97 According to the plurality, the 
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admission of a codefendant’s interlocking confession does not 
violate the Bruton doctrine because the other defendant has 
himself confessed, which is “probably the most probative and 
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.”98 
Therefore, admitting the codefendant’s interlocking confession 
would not have the “devastating” practical effect forecast by the 
Bruton Court, and the Bruton remedy of “cross-examination 
would likely yield small advantage to the defendant whose own 
admission of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged.”99  
Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of the case 
while three dissenting Justices would have found a Bruton 
doctrine violation and reversed.100 Meanwhile, Justice Blackmun 
concurred with the plurality, deeming the admission of the 
interlocking confessions harmless error based upon the facts of 
the case before him.101 Justice Blackmun, however, specifically 
refused to join the plurality’s new interlocking confession 
exception to Bruton, concluding that “it abandon[ed] the 
harmless-error analysis” the Court announced in Harrington.102 
Blackmun concluded that when the prosecution admits a 
nontestifying codefendant’s confession that also implicates other 
defendants, there is a violation of the Bruton doctrine, and the 
question then becomes whether that violation constituted 
harmless error.103 According to Justice Blackmun, the fact that the 
codefendant’s confession interlocks with other defendants’ 
confessions is only relevant to the harmless error analysis—not 
the baseline question of whether there was a Bruton 
doctrine/Confrontation Clause violation.104 Eight years later, in 
Cruz v. New York, a majority of the Court would agree with him.105 
E. Ohio v. Roberts and Adequate Indicia of Reliability 
In the interim, in 1980, the Supreme Court in Ohio v. 
Roberts finally articulated a test that addressed the issue of 
whether the admission of hearsay violates the Confrontation 
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Clause because it is constitutionally unreliable,106 a test that it 
would later refine in Crawford v. Washington.  
According to the Court, its task in Roberts was to 
determine “the relationship between the Confrontation Clause 
and the hearsay rule with its many exceptions.”107 And 
according to the Court, even if a declarant’s hearsay 
statements are admissible against a defendant under an 
exception to the rule against hearsay, they run afoul of the 
Confrontation Clause if the declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial unless the State establishes two 
elements.108 First, the State must establish that the declarant is 
“unavailable.”109 Second, it must prove that the statement 
“bears adequate indicia of reliability.”110 The Court concluded 
that “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where 
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”111 If 
a statement does not fall within such an exception, “the 
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”112 
The Court concluded that when defense counsel tests 
preliminary hearing testimony with cross-examination or the 
equivalent of cross-examination, that testimony bears 
sufficient indicia of reliability and affords the trier of fact a 
basis for evaluating the truth of the testimony sufficient to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause.113  
F. Lee v. Illinois and Actual Harm 
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Lee v. Illinois,114 a case 
that resembled Bruton in all regards but one: the trier of fact. In 
Lee, Millie Lee and Edwin Thomas were charged with committing 
a double murder after both signed written confessions.115 As in 
Parker v. Randolph, these confessions interlocked, at least to a 
certain degree: Thomas’s confession implicated Lee in the 
murders.116 But unlike the Randolph defendants, Lee and Thomas 
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were jointly tried before a judge, not a jury.117 Thomas did not 
testify, the prosecutor introduced his confession, and the trial 
judge expressly explained that he relied upon Thomas’s 
confession in finding Lee guilty of both murders.118 
Lee appealed thereafter and claimed that the trial court 
improperly used Thomas’s confession as evidence of her guilt. 
But the Appellate Court of Illinois disagreed and found no 
Bruton doctrine problem because Thomas’s confession 
interlocked with Lee’s.119 According to the Court, Lee did not 
involve two issues. First, the Court proclaimed that Lee was 
“not strictly speaking a Bruton case because [the Court was] 
not . . . concerned with the effectiveness of limiting instructions 
in preventing the spill-over prejudice to a defendant when his 
codefendant’s confession is admitted against the codefendant at 
a joint trial.”120 Instead, Lee involved a bench trial in which the 
judge acknowledged that he used Thomas’s confession as 
evidence of Lee’s guilt, meaning that “[t]he danger against 
which the Confrontation Clause was erected . . . actually 
occurred.”121 Second, the case did not involve the issue of 
whether the trial court violated Illinois evidence law in using 
Thomas’s confession as evidence of Lee’s guilt because that was 
a matter of state law.122  
Instead, the sole issue before the Court was whether 
Thomas’s confession had adequate indicia of reliability under 
Ohio v. Roberts such that it could be admitted directly against 
Lee without violating the Confrontation Clause.123 While the 
Court found that Thomas’s confession interlocked with Lee’s 
confession to a certain extent, it ultimately concluded that 
there were discrepancies between the two confessions that 
were neither irrelevant nor trivial.124 Accordingly, the Court 
found a Confrontation Clause violation because “when the 
discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the 
co-defendant’s confession may not be admitted.”125 Thus, 
according to the Court, there simply were inadequate indicia of 
reliability to allow for the admission of the statement. 
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G. Richardson v. Marsh: The Redaction Solution 
The Court again addressed a case resembling Bruton in 
every regard but one in Richardson v. Marsh. In Richardson, 
Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were 
charged with assault and murder.126 Marsh and Williams were 
later given a joint jury trial, and Williams did not testify.127 The 
prosecution, however, introduced Williams’s confession, in 
which he implicated Marsh, Martin, and himself in the subject 
crimes.128 The confession was carefully redacted to remove all 
references to Marsh; these redactions “omit[ted] all indication 
that anyone other than Martin and Williams participated in 
the crime.”129 After admitting the redacted confession, the Court 
admonished the jury “not to use it in any way against [Marsh]” 
because the confession was inadmissible against Marsh under 
the rules of evidence.130 
The Court found that, unlike the confession in Bruton, 
based upon the redaction, “in this case the confession was not 
incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with 
evidence introduced later at trial . . . .”131 This fact was 
significant to the Court, which concluded that “[w]here the 
necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid 
generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction 
to disregard the evidence.”132 According to the Court, while it 
may not be simple for jurors to respect an instruction to use a 
codefendant’s confession that does not facially incriminate 
other defendants only as evidence of the codefendant’s guilt, 
“there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their 
inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton’s exception to 
the general rule.”133 
Finally, the Court noted that its decision was at least 
partly based upon practicality. According to the Court, if the 
Bruton doctrine only applies “to facially incriminating 
confessions, Bruton can be complied with by redaction—a 
possibility suggested in that opinion itself.”134 Conversely, if the 
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doctrine were extended to include “confessions incriminating by 
connection, not only is that not possible, but it is not even 
possible to predict the admissibility of a confession in advance 
of trial.”135 Instead, trial judges would not be able to determine 
whether such confessions were sufficiently incriminatory until 
the close of the evidence, which, “even without manipulation 
w[ould] result in numerous mistrials and appeals.”136  
H. Cruz v. New York: Interlocking Confessions, Take Two  
In 1987, the Supreme Court finally answered—in the 
affirmative—the question it had left unresolved eight years 
earlier in Randolph137: Does the admission of interlocking 
confessions violate the Bruton doctrine? In Cruz v. New York, 
Eulogio and Benjamin Cruz were indicted for felony murder 
and jointly tried before a jury.138 Before trial, Benjamin gave a 
videotaped confession in which he admitted that Eulogio, two 
other men, and he committed the crime charged.139 Benjamin 
did not testify at trial, but the trial court, over Eulogio’s 
objection, allowed the prosecution to introduce Benjamin’s 
confession into evidence. The court then instructed the jury to 
use Benjamin’s confession as evidence of his guilt only because 
it was inadmissible against Eulogio under the rules of 
evidence.140 After Eulogio was convicted, he appealed, and the 
New York Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, finding that 
Eulogio gave a confession that “interlocked” with Benjamin’s 
confession, rendering the Bruton doctrine inapplicable.141 
A majority of the United States Supreme Court 
disagreed, rejecting the plurality opinion in Parker v. 
Randolph.142 As noted, the Randolph plurality would have 
removed interlocking confessions from the purview of the 
Bruton doctrine on the theory that a codefendant’s confession 
cannot be devastating to the case of a defendant who has 
himself confessed and devastated his own case.143 The Cruz 
Court rejected this reasoning, finding that “[a] co-defendant’s 
confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story 
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it tells is different from that which the defendant himself is 
alleged to have told, but enormously damaging if it confirms, in 
all essential respects, the defendant’s alleged confession.”144  
This finding led the Cruz Court to conclude, contrary to 
the position of the Parker plurality, that interlocking 
confessions are covered by the Bruton doctrine, which is merely 
concerned with the harmfulness of codefendant confessions, not 
their (un)reliability.145 According to the Court,  
Quite obviously, what the “interlocking” nature of the codefendant’s 
confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability: 
If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant’s own 
confession it is more likely to be true. Its reliability . . . may be 
relevant to whether the confession should (despite the lack of 
opportunity for cross-examination) be admitted as evidence against 
the defendant, see Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 90 
L.E.2d 514 (1986), but cannot conceivably be relevant to whether, 
assuming it cannot be admitted, the jury is likely to obey the 
instruction to disregard it, or the jury’s failure to obey is likely to be 
inconsequential. The law cannot command respect if such an 
inexplicable exception to a supposed constitutional imperative is 
adopted. Having decided Bruton, we must face the honest 
consequences of what it holds.146 
And for the Court, the honest consequence was that the 
case before it was “indistinguishable from Bruton with respect to 
those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this area: the 
likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded, . . . the 
probability that such disregard will have a devastating 
effect, . . . and the determinability of these factors in advance of 
trial.”147 
In other words, the Cruz Court “adopt[ed] the approach 
espoused by Justice Blackmun” in his concurrence in Parker v. 
Randolph.148 Under this approach, even interlocking confessions 
are covered by the Bruton doctrine, and the only question is 
whether the improper admission of such a confession is 
harmless error.149 According to the Court, lower courts could use 
the fact that the defendant made a confession that interlocked 
with his codefendant’s confession in this harmless error 
analysis.150 But the fact that the defendant gave an interlocking 
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confession had no bearing on the issue of whether there was a 
Bruton doctrine violation.151  
I. Gray v. Maryland: Obvious Omissions 
The Supreme Court resolved its last major Bruton 
doctrine case eleven years later in 1998, holding that 
prosecutors cannot bypass the Bruton doctrine by blatantly 
redacting codefendant confessions. In Gray v. Maryland, 
Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray were jointly tried for the murder 
of Stacey Williams.152 After Bell was arrested, a police detective 
asked him, “Who was in the group that beat Stacey?” and he 
responded that it was “he (Bell), Kevin Gray, and Jacquin 
‘Tank’ Vanlandingham.”153 Bell did not testify at trial, but the 
trial court allowed the detective to repeat his question and 
restate Bell’s confession as “Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other 
guys.”154 Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked the 
detective whether it was true that Bell’s confession led the police 
to be able to arrest Gray; the officer responded, “That’s 
correct.”155 Finally, the trial court allowed the prosecution to 
introduce a written copy of Bell’s confession with the names of 
Gray and Vanlandingham “omitted, leaving in their place blank 
white spaces separated by commas.”156 Later, the court instructed 
the jury that Bell’s “confession was evidence only against Bell; 
the instructions said that the jury should not use the confession 
as evidence against Gray” because the confession was 
inadmissible against Gray under the rules of evidence.157 
After Gray was convicted, he appealed in the Maryland 
state courts and ultimately filed a successful petition for writ of 
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Court 
acknowledged that in Richardson v. Marsh, it held that the 
admission of codefendant confessions redacted to remove any 
reference to the existence of other defendants does not violate the 
Bruton doctrine because they do not facially incriminate other 
defendants.158 The Court, however, distinguished the redacted 
confession before it from the redacted confession in Marsh: 
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Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space 
or a word such as “deleted” or a symbol or other similarly obvious 
indications of alteration . . . leave statements that, considered as a 
class, so closely resemble Bruton’s unredacted statements that, in 
our view, the law must require the same result.159 
The Court dismissed the argument that its ruling would 
leave prosecutors with no alternative but to abandon the use of 
codefendant confessions or joint trials, instead finding that 
“[a]dditional redaction of a confession that uses a blank space, 
the word ‘delete,’ or a symbol . . . normally is possible.”160 For 
example, the Court wondered why Bell’s confession could not 
have been altered to read, “Me and a few other guys.”161 
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by three 
other Justices.162 He took particular exception to the majority’s 
suggestion that the detective could have testified that Bell 
admitted that he “and a few other guys” beat Stacey.163 Scalia 
was aware of no prior case in which the Court had endorsed 
“the redaction of a statement by some means other than the 
deletion of certain words, with the fact of the deletion shown.”164 
According to Scalia, “[t]he risk to the integrity of our system 
(not to mention the increase in its complexity) posed by the 
approval of such freelance editing seems to me infinitely 
greater than the risk posed by the entirely honest reproduction 
that the Court disapproves.”165  
J. Constitutional Harmfulness, Not Constitutional 
Reliability 
These Supreme Court cases reveal that the Supreme 
Court construes the Bruton doctrine as a test of constitutional 
harmfulness, not as a test of constitutional (un)reliability. In 
Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court laid out the constitutional 
reliability test: if a statement lacks adequate indicia of 
reliability, its admission violates the Confrontation Clause, 
even if it qualifies for admission under an exception to the rule 
against hearsay.166 
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Conversely, according to the Court in Cruz, if a 
nontestifying codefendant’s confession that facially incriminates 
another defendant is inadmissible against that other defendant 
under the rules of evidence, its admission at a joint jury trial 
violates the Bruton doctrine and Confrontation Clause, regardless 
of the statement’s reliability.167 Instead, the Bruton doctrine is a 
test of constitutional harmfulness: if a codefendant’s confession is 
sufficiently harmful or damaging to another defendant, it violates 
the Bruton doctrine; if it is not sufficiently harmful or can be 
made less harmful, it may be admitted.168  
Thus, a codefendant’s confession that does not facially 
incriminate another defendant is admissible despite the Bruton 
doctrine not because it is any more reliable, but because it is less 
harmful to the other defendant.169 Similarly, a codefendant’s 
confession that redacts any reference to another defendant does 
not violate the Bruton doctrine not because it is any more 
reliable than that same confession before redaction, but because, 
again, it is less harmful to the other defendant.170 On the other 
hand, a redacted confession with the other defendant’s name 
replaced with an obvious sign of redaction does violate the 
Bruton doctrine; the other defendant is harmed substantially by 
the admission of such an obviously redacted confession.171 
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE CRAWFORD 
REVOLUTION 
A. Crawford v. Washington and “Testimonial” Hearsay 
In the 2004 case Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme 
Court reconsidered and replaced the adequate indicia of 
reliability test from Ohio v. Roberts. In Crawford, Michael 
Crawford stabbed Kenneth Lee, who allegedly tried to rape 
Michael’s wife, Sylvia.172 Officers arrived and Mirandized 
Michael and Sylvia, who each gave tape-recorded statements.173 
And while Sylvia’s account of the events leading up to the 
stabbing generally corroborated her husband’s story, “her 
account of the fight was arguably different—particularly with 
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respect to whether Lee had drawn a weapon before [Michael] 
assaulted him . . . [.]”174 
At Michael’s trial for assault and attempted murder, 
Sylvia did not testify pursuant to Washington’s spousal 
testimonial privilege.175 Therefore, the State introduced Sylvia’s 
tape-recorded statement over Michael’s objection as a 
statement against penal interest (an exception to the rule 
against hearsay).176 After he was convicted, Michael appealed, 
claiming that the admission of Sylvia’s statement violated the 
Confrontation Clause, and the Washington Court of Appeals 
agreed with him.177 But the Supreme Court of Washington 
found no Confrontation Clause violation: it concluded that 
Sylvia’s statement bore guarantees of trustworthiness 
sufficient to satisfy Ohio v. Roberts.178 Michael thereafter filed a 
successful petition for writ of certiorari with the United States 
Supreme Court, asserting that the Ohio v. Roberts test strayed 
from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.179  
The Court considered the historical background of the 
Confrontation Clause to ascertain the validity of Crawford’s 
claim and concluded that this history supported two 
inferences.180 First, the Court found that “the principal evil at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law 
mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused”181—that is, 
examinations of accusers conducted before trial and without 
the defendant present. Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
Confrontation Clause covers live testimony in court as well as 
ex parte testimony or “testimonial” statements.182  
The Court articulated various formulations of 
“testimonial statements,” defining them at one point as 
“statements that were made under circumstances which would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”183 The 
Court, however, neither chose one of these formulations nor 
concluded that the Confrontation Clause was only concerned 
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with testimonial hearsay. Instead, it was enough for the Court 
to conclude that “even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely 
concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, 
and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely 
within that class.”184 According to the Court, “[a]n accuser who 
makes a formal statement to government officers bears 
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark 
to an acquaintance does not.”185 
The Court’s second inference was “that the Framers 
would not have allowed the admission of testimonial statements 
of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was 
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”186 The Court then explained 
that the case law had largely been consistent with both of these 
principles.187 According to the Court, with one arguable exception, 
its cases remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause: “Testimonial statements of witnesses 
absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is 
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine.”188 In reaching this conclusion, 
however, the Court noted that its prior opinions in Parker v. 
Randolph and Cruz v. New York did not address the question of 
whether testimonial hearsay by an unconfronted declarant 
violated the Confrontation Clause but instead “addressed the 
entirely different question whether a limiting instruction cured 
prejudice to codefendants from admitting a defendant’s own 
confession against him in a joint trial.”189 
Conversely, the Court concluded that the Ohio v. 
Roberts test departed from the Framers’ understanding in ways 
that both helped and hurt criminal defendants. First, the test 
was too broad because it required the exclusion of even 
nontestimonial hearsay if a prosecutor could not prove that the 
hearsay had adequate indicia of reliability.190 Second, the test 
was too narrow because it allowed for the admission of even 
testimonial hearsay as long as a prosecutor could prove that it 
was sufficiently reliable.191 In these ways, the Roberts test 
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“replace[d] the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing 
reliability with a wholly foreign one.”192 This rendered the 
Roberts test “very different from exceptions to the 
Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a surrogate 
means of assessing reliability.”193 As a counterpoint, the Court 
referenced and accepted the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing, which “extinguishes confrontation claims on 
essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an 
alternative means of determining reliability.”194 
Moreover, the Court deemed the adequate indicia of 
reliability test to be “so unpredictable that it fail[ed] to provide 
meaningful protection from even core confrontation 
violations.”195 The Court, though, deemed this unpredictability a 
forgivable sin compared with “[t]he unpardonable vice of the 
Roberts test”: “its demonstrated capacity to admit core 
testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly 
meant to exclude.”196  
The Court thus replaced the adequate indicia of 
reliability test with the following test: “Where testimonial 
evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what 
the common law required: unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”197 Or, put simply, “[w]here 
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the 
one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”198 
Finding that Sylvia’s statement to the police officers was 
testimonial and that Michael had no opportunity to cross-
examine her, the Supreme Court thus concluded that a 
Confrontation Clause violation existed.199  
But does the Confrontation Clause only cover 
testimonial hearsay? The Court would answer that question in 
the affirmative a few years later. 
  
 192 Id. at 62. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 63. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 68. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
2012] AVOIDING A CONFRONTATION? 651 
B. Davis, Bockting and the Testimonial/Nontestimonial 
Dichotomy 
In 2006, the Court resolved the companion cases of 
Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana. In Davis, 
Michelle McCottry made statements to a 911 operator 
identifying Adrian Davis as her assailant, just after he had 
assaulted her.200 In Hammon, police responded to the site of a 
“reported domestic disturbance at the house of Amy and 
Hershel Hammon.”201 Amy initially told officers that “nothing 
was the matter,” but while an officer was with Hershel in the 
kitchen, Amy filled out and signed a battery affidavit in the 
living room with the other officer.202 
McCottry did not testify at Davis’s trial, and Amy 
Hammon did not testify at her husband’s trial, but their 
statements were each admitted under exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay.203 Deciding whether the admission of either 
statement violated the Confrontation Clause, the Davis Court 
answered two questions left unresolved by Crawford: (1) whether 
the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay and 
(2) which police interrogations produce testimonial hearsay.204 
The Court answered the first question in the 
affirmative, concluding that “[i]t is the testimonial character of 
the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while 
subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not 
subject to the Confrontation Clause.”205 In response to the 
second question, the Court created a dichotomy to resolve the 
cases before it: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.206 
Using this test, the Court deemed Michelle McCottry’s 
statements nontestimonial and properly admitted but 
  
 200 547 U.S. 813, 817-18, 827 (2006). 
 201 Id. at 819. 
 202 Id. at 819-20. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at 823. 
 205 Id. at 821. 
 206 Id. at 822. 
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concluded that Amy Hammon’s statements were testimonial.207 
The Court acknowledged that Hammon’s statements, despite 
being testimonial, could still be admitted against her husband 
if he procured or coerced silence from her because “one who 
obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the 
constitutional right to confrontation.”208 According to the Court, 
this rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing still survived because 
“Crawford, in overruling Roberts, did not destroy the ability of 
courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.”209 But in the 
absence of such forfeiture, the admission of her statements 
violated the Confrontation Clause.210 
Later, in Whorton v. Bockting, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that “[u]nder Crawford, . . . . the Confrontation 
Clause has no application to [nontestimonial] statements and 
therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of 
reliability.”211 In its 2011 opinion in Michigan v. Bryant, 
however, a majority of the Court noted that to conduct the 
primary purpose analysis of Davis, “standard rules of hearsay, 
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be 
relevant.”212 This led some,213 including Justice Scalia in his 
dissenting opinion, to conclude that the majority was 
resurrecting the Roberts adequate indicia of reliability test 
without explicitly overruling Crawford.214 
III. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF BRUTON 
Lower court interpretations of the Bruton doctrine 
corroborate the claim that the doctrine is a test of 
constitutional harmfulness and not a test of constitutional 
reliability. This section breaks down the way that lower courts 
have handled the Bruton doctrine, before and after Crawford, 
to reveal that Crawford did not transform the Bruton doctrine 
into a test of constitutional reliability concerned with whether 
codefendant statements are testimonial or nontestimonial. 
  
 207 Id. at 828-30. 
 208 Id. at 833. 
 209 Id. at 834. 
 210 Id. at 833-34. 
 211 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007). 
 212 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
 213 See, e.g., Colin Miller, Michigan v. Bryant, Part 6, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG 
(Mar. 3, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2011/03/yesterday-i-posted-
an-entryaboutjustice-scalia-accusing-the-majority-in-michigan-v-bryantofretreating-
fromcrawford-v-washi.html. 
 214 131 S. Ct. at 1168-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Instead, these cases reveal that the testimonial/nontestimonial 
dichotomy is entirely separate from the Bruton doctrine. 
A. The Inapplicability of the Bruton Doctrine at Bench 
Trials 
 1. Pre-Crawford Precedent 
In the wake of the Court’s opinion in Lee v. Illinois, 
several courts grappled with the question of whether the 
Bruton doctrine applies to bench trials or whether it applies 
only to jury trials. Every federal appellate court that addressed 
the issue before Crawford concluded the doctrine was 
inapplicable to cases heard by judges rather than juries.215  
For example, in Rogers v. McMackin, Darrick Rogers, 
Mimi Cash, Ricardo Forney, and Andre Robinson were 
allegedly coparticipants in a restaurant robbery and the fatal 
shooting of its proprietor.216 Rogers confessed to the crime, and 
Robinson also gave a confession that largely interlocked with 
Rogers’s confession.217 The two were given a joint bench trial, 
and the prosecution introduced Robinson’s confession despite 
the fact that he did not testify at trial.218 After Rogers was 
convicted and exhausted his state court remedies, he brought a 
habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio, claiming that the admission 
of Robinson’s confession violated the Bruton doctrine.219 
The district court agreed with Rogers, finding that Lee 
made the Bruton doctrine applicable to bench trials.220 With this 
“understanding of Lee, the district court looked for the 
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ required by Ohio 
v. Roberts . . . ; finding none, the court concluded that the 
admission of Robinson’s confession constituted prejudicial error 
of constitutional dimension.”221  
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, noting that the Court 
explicitly found that Lee was “‘not strictly speaking a Bruton 
case’” because it did not concern the effectiveness of limiting 
  
 215 See, e.g., United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1155 (5th Cir. 1993) (joining 
several other circuits in finding that the Bruton doctrine is inapplicable to bench trials). 
 216 884 F.2d 252, 253 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 254. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 257. 
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instructions to the jury.222 Indeed, “[t]he Lee Court did not even 
consider whether the co-defendant’s confession was so 
‘devastating’ as to prevent its proper use.”223 Moreover, the 
Sixth Circuit pointed out that “although Lee, like Parker v. 
Randolph, . . . was a case of interlocking confessions, the Lee 
Court focused not on whether their interlocking nature made 
them ‘devastating,’ but on whether their interlocking nature 
made them reliable.”224 Finally, the court then refused to make 
this extension itself, finding that there was no reason to 
conclude that judges, like jurors, are “incapable of separating 
evidence properly admitted against one defendant from 
evidence admitted against another.”225 
 2. Post-Crawford Precedent 
In the wake of the Court’s opinion in Crawford and its 
progeny, courts categorically continue to conclude that the 
Bruton doctrine does not apply to joint bench trials, even if the 
codefendant’s confession is testimonial, implying that the 
testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy does not apply to the 
Bruton doctrine. For instance, in West v. Jones, the court found 
the Bruton doctrine inapplicable to bench trials because “[t]rial 
courts are presumed to consider only properly admitted and 
relevant evidence in rendering its decision and to give no 
weight to improper testimonial evidence, which is taken under 
objection.”226 
Later finding that the Bruton doctrine was inapplicable 
to bench trials, the Third Circuit noted that it was “agree[ing] 
with every United States Court of Appeals that has considered 
the question.”227 
  
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 No. 04-CV-40199-FL, 2006 WL 508652, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2006). As 
in Lee, however, the court found that there was evidence that the trial judge relied on 
Coleman’s confession to find West guilty. Id. at *4. Because this meant that the trial 
judge in effect allowed for the admission of Coleman’s testimonial confession as 
evidence against West, the Court found a Confrontation Clause violation, but not under 
the Bruton doctrine. Id. at *3-4. Finding this violation to be harmless error, the court 
denied West’s petition. Id. at *7. 
 227 Johnson v. Tennis, 549 F.3d 296, 298 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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B. The Bruton Doctrine and the Neutral Pronoun Solution 
 1. Pre-Crawford Precedent 
As noted, the Richardson v. Marsh Court found that the 
redaction of a defendant’s confession to remove all references to 
codefendants satisfied the Bruton doctrine and the 
Confrontation Clause.228 Later, in Gray v. Maryland, the Court 
found that redactions of codefendant confessions that simply 
replace names with obvious blank spaces, words such as 
“deleted,” symbols, or other similarly obvious indications of 
alteration do violate the Bruton doctrine and the Confrontation 
Clause.229 In Marsh, the Court left open the question of whether 
defendant confessions can be redacted to replace the names of 
other codefendants with neutral pronouns consistent with the 
Confrontation Clause.230 In Gray, the Court did not explicitly 
approve of this practice, but it did strongly imply that it found 
this practice permissible. As noted, the Gray Court found that 
a codefendant’s confession that “[Me], Kevin Gray, and Jacquin 
‘Tank’ Vanlandingham” were in the group that beat up the 
victim could not be redacted to read, “Me, deleted, deleted, and 
a few other guys.”231 Later, however, the majority wondered why 
the codefendant’s confession could not have been altered to 
read, “Me and a few other guys.”232 
Before Crawford, courts consistently concluded that the 
Bruton doctrine does not apply when codefendant confessions 
are redacted to replace other defendants’ names with neutral 
pronouns.233 For instance, in United States v. Logan, after a 
joint jury trial, Benjamin Logan was convicted of several 
crimes, including robbery.234 Logan’s codefendant, Zachary 
Roan, confessed to a detective that he planned and committed 
the robbery with Logan.235 At their joint trial, Roan did not 
testify, so the prosecution called the detective who testified 
  
 228 See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text. 
 230 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 n.5 (1987) (“We express no opinion 
on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant’s name has been replaced 
with a symbol or neutral pronoun.”). 
 231 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 232 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 233 See, e.g., United States v. Winston, 55 F. App’x 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that “several of our sister circuits have noted that a Bruton violation can be 
avoided by replacing the co-defendant’s name with a neutral pronoun or other 
generalized phrase”). 
 234 210 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 235 Id. 
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that Roan confessed that he planned and committed the subject 
robbery with “another individual.”236 
In finding that the admission of Roan’s redacted 
confession complied with the Bruton doctrine and the 
Confrontation Clause, the Eighth Circuit noted in 2000 that 
the Marsh Court left open the question of whether courts could 
replace the names of other defendants with neutral pronouns.237 
That said, the court found that “the principles on which Marsh 
was decided provide[d] clear guidance on how to resolve the 
instant difficulty.”238 According to the Eighth Circuit, Marsh 
held that the Bruton doctrine only precludes the admission of 
codefendant confessions that facially incriminate other 
defendants, and confessions redacted to replace other 
defendants’ names with neutral pronouns do not facially 
incriminate other defendants.239 To reach this conclusion, the 
court found that it was “simply adher[ing] to a view that 
several of our cases have long since adopted.”240 
 2. Post-Crawford Precedent 
After Crawford and its progeny, courts categorically 
continue to conclude that the admission of a codefendant 
confession redacted to replace the names of other defendants 
with neutral pronouns does not violate the Bruton doctrine. For 
instance, in United States v. Akefe, Aderemi J. Akefe and Na-
Heem Tokumbo Alade were charged with conspiracy to import 
heroin into the United States and conspiracy to distribute 
heroin.241 The two were given a joint jury trial, and Alade did 
not testify.242 At trial, the prosecution called Special Agent 
Michael Galu to testify. Galu conducted Alade’s post-arrest 
interview, and the prosecutor engaged him in the following 
colloquy during trial: 
Q. Other than this post-arrest interview, did Mr. Alade make any 
other statements to you? 
A. He did. 
Q. When did he make those statements? 
  
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 822. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 No. 09 CR 196(RPP), 2010 WL 2899805, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2010). 
 242 Id.  
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A. When, later that evening, I had transported Mr. Alade to the 
Wayne County jail and as I was escorting Mr. Alade from my vehicle 
to the jail processing center, he stated that, he said, oh man, I didn’t 
know you guys got him too, man, I can help you out, I can help you 
out. 
Q. Who was he referring to? 
A. Another person arrested in this case.243 
Alade in fact had referred to Akefe, and the trial court 
permitted Galu to answer this last question with the neutral 
pronoun “another person” rather than with Akefe’s name to 
prevent a Bruton doctrine violation.244 After this testimony by 
Galu, the court instructed jurors only to use Alade’s statement 
as evidence of his guilt and not as evidence of Akefe’s guilt.245 
After he was convicted, Akefe appealed, claiming that 
Alade’s statements to Galu were “testimonial” and thus 
inadmissible under Crawford.246 The court disagreed, finding 
that Alade’s reliance on Crawford “in attacking the 
Government’s use of Alade’s Brutonized statement [wa]s 
misplaced because Crawford held that testimonial hearsay 
offered against a criminal defendant is unconstitutional under 
the confrontation clause and therefore inadmissible.”247 
According to the court, Crawford was irrelevant because “the 
challenged testimony was offered only against Alade and the 
jury was instructed accordingly.”248 The court thus concluded 
that “Crawford is inapplicable and Alade’s Brutonized post-
arrest statement admitted solely against Alade is only violative 
of Akefe’s confrontation clause rights if it violates the rules set 
out in Bruton v. United States, . . . Richardson v. 
Marsh, . . . and their progeny.”249  
The court then failed to find such a violation, initially 
noting that “[t]he Second Circuit has been clear that 
statements made by defendants are admissible against the 
speaker where the statement is redacted to replace the names 
of co-defendants with neutral pronouns and the statement on 
its face does not connect co-defendants to the crimes.”250 The 
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court then asserted that Alade’s statement fell “squarely 
within Second Circuit precedent because Akefe’s name was 
replaced with a neutral pronoun, and the statement, standing 
alone, did not implicate Akefe.”251 The Second Circuit is not 
alone in this regard. Instead, as the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia noted in its 2011 opinion 
United States v. Clarke, “[t]he use of neutral pronouns or other 
general identifiers, such as ‘other guys,’ has been recognized by 
several circuits as a type of redaction that satisfies Bruton.”252  
C. The Bruton Doctrine and Noncustodial/Nontestimonial 
Hearsay  
 1. Pre-Crawford Precedent 
Before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Crawford, the 
vast majority of courts held that codefendants’ statements that 
were noncustodial (and would now be considered 
nontestimonial) were covered by the Bruton doctrine. For 
instance, in State v. Swafford, Artis Swafford, Jan Anthony, 
and Joel Butler were jointly tried before a jury on charges of 
felony murder and aggravated robbery.253 Previously, Anthony 
unwittingly made statements to confidential informant Lamar 
Williams that also implicated Swafford and Butler.254 At trial, 
Anthony did not testify, and the prosecution introduced a typed 
transcript of these statements, with the names “Swafford” and 
“Butler” deleted, “but blank spaces with underlining were 
left.”255 After he was convicted, Swafford appealed, claiming 
that the admission of the transcript violated the Bruton 
doctrine.256 The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed, concluding 
that “[w]hile the conversation between Lamar Williams and 
Anthony is not a typical post-arrest confession, Bruton applies 
to any extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying 
codefendant.”257 Moreover, the court found that “Bruton applies 
to a statement made in a noncustodial setting as well to a 
statement made to other coconspirators if, as in this case, such 
  
 251 Id. at *26. According to the court, “[t]here was no evidence that the two 
defendants on trial were the only individuals arrested in the investigation.” Id. 
 252 767 F. Supp. 2d 12, 31 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 253 913 P.2d 196, 198 (Kan. 1996). 
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statement is not made during the life of, and in furtherance of, 
the conspiracy.”258 Courts also consistently found that the 
Bruton doctrine was violated by the admission of similar 
noncustodial statements made to mothers,259 brothers,260 
lovers,261 and other friends and family members.262 
There were a few opinions before Crawford which held 
that noncustodial statements were beyond the scope of the 
Bruton doctrine, but these were the exceptions to the rule and 
often based upon mistaken reasoning more than anything else. 
For instance, in Brown v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
found that the admission of a codefendant’s noncustodial 
statements that qualified as coconspirator admissions did not 
violate the Bruton doctrine.263 This was not a controversial 
conclusion, as the Court in Delli Paoli pointed out that the 
introduction of coconspirator admission presents no problems 
under the Confrontation Clause.264 Later, however, Georgia 
courts began citing Brown and its progeny to support the 
proposition that noncustodial statements made after the 
completion of conspiracies were beyond the scope of the Bruton 
doctrine. These opinions read more as mistaken interpretations 
of prior precedent rather than the courts consciously limiting 
the scope of the Bruton doctrine.265 
  
 258 Id. 
 259 See, e.g., People v. Jimenez, No. C038273, 2002 WL 1486571, at *1-3 (Cal. 
Ct. App. July 11, 2002) (finding a violation of the Bruton doctrine—but harmless 
error—based upon the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s incriminatory 
statement to his mother). 
 260 See, e.g., United States v. Ruff, 717 F.2d 855, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding 
a violation of the Bruton doctrine—but harmless error—based upon the admission of a 
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 261 See, e.g., Holland v. Att’y Gen., 777 F.2d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding a 
violation of the Bruton doctrine based upon the admission of a nontestifying 
codefendant’s incriminatory statement to his wife).  
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violation of the Bruton doctrine based upon the admission of a nontestifying 
codefendant’s incriminatory statement to his sister); Monachelli v. Warden, SCI 
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 263 416 S.E.2d 508, 509-10 (Ga. 1992). 
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details the criminal participation of’ a co-defendant.” Id. (quoting Reid, 437 S.E.2d 
646). In Reid, however, the court had found that a codefendant confession did not 
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 2. Post-Crawford Precedent 
After Crawford, the tables have largely turned, with the 
vast majority of courts finding that codefendants statements 
that are nontestimonial (and would have been considered 
noncustodial) are beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine. Many 
of these opinions concluding that nontestimonial hearsay is 
beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine were handed down in 
2010, such as the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. 
Dale,266 which was issued on July 30, 2010. In Dale, police found 
the bodies of Anthony Rios and Olivia Raya as well as several 
bricks of marijuana and cocaine at the couple’s Kansas City 
home.267 During their investigation of these murders, law 
enforcement officials convinced inmate Anthony Smith to wear a 
wire and talk with Michael Dale, a suspect in the murders and 
an inmate at the same facility as Smith.268 Smith eventually 
recorded a conversation with Dale in which Dale incriminated 
Dyshawn Johnson and himself in the murders.269 Dale and 
Johnson were later jointly tried before a jury on charges of first-
degree murder and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and Dale 
did not testify at trial.270 At trial, the prosecution played the 
recording of Dale’s confession to jurors and instructed them that 
the tape-recorded conversation was not admissible against 
Johnson.271 
After he was convicted, Johnson appealed, claiming that 
the admission of Dale’s statements violated the Bruton 
doctrine.272 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that Dale’s 
statements were nontestimonial and that after Davis v. 
Washington and Whorton v. Bockting, “[i]t is now clear that the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply to non-testimonial 
statements by an out-of-court declarant.”273 Therefore, the court 
concluded that under its “present understanding of the 
confrontation right, governed by Crawford, the introduction of 
  
violate the Bruton doctrine not simply because it was noncustodial but because it “was 
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Dale’s out of court statements did not violate Johnson’s 
confrontation right.”274 
Nine days before Dale, on July 21, 2010, the Sixth Circuit 
found that a codefendant’s statement to a confidential informant 
that implicated another defendant could not violate the Bruton 
doctrine because it was nontestimonial.275 Two weeks before Dale, 
the First Circuit found that a codefendant’s similar statement to 
his mother also was beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine 
because it was nontestimonial.276 And, two months before Dale, 
the Tenth Circuit concluded in United States v. Smalls that a 
codefendant’s statements to a confidential informant were 
properly admitted at a joint jury trial because “the Bruton rule, 
like the Confrontation Clause upon which it is premised, does not 
apply to nontestimonial hearsay statements.”277 Finally, in 2008, 
the Second Circuit applied the same reasoning to a codefendant’s 
confession to a fellow inmate.278  
To this point, the only federal circuit court to find that 
nontestimonial codefendant statements can violate the Bruton 
doctrine after Crawford is the Third Circuit.279 Similarly, most 
federal district courts have found after Crawford that 
nontestimonial hearsay is beyond the scope of the Bruton 
doctrine, but a couple of federal district courts have reached 
contrary conclusions.280 
V. THE BRUTON DOCTRINE SHOULD STILL COVER 
NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY 
This section asserts that there are two possible 
interpretations of the scope of the Bruton doctrine in the wake 
of Crawford and its progeny—and that each should preclude 
  
 274 Id. at 956. 
 275 United States v. Sutton, 387 F. App’x 595, 602-03 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 276 United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 277 605 F.3d 765, 768 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 278 See United States v. Pike, 292 F. App’x 108, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding 
that a codefendant’s incriminatory statement to a fellow inmate could not violate the 
Bruton doctrine because it was nontestimonial). 
 279 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 381 F. App’x 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We 
have interpreted Bruton’s rule broadly, applying it not only to custodial confessions but 
also to informal statements such as Gwen’s.”). 
 280 Compare United States v. Koning, No. 4:09CR3031, 2010 WL 3984739, at 
*6 (D. Neb. Sept. 10, 2010) (“However, Bruton in not applicable to the McWha 
documents. As very recently explained by the Eighth Circuit, ‘[t]he Confrontation 
Clause does not apply to non-testimonial statements by an out-of-court declarant.’”), 
with United States v. Williams, No. 1:09cr414 (JCC), 2010 WL 3909480, at *4 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 23, 2010) (finding that “Bruton can apply to non-confessional statements”). 
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the admission of nontestimonial codefendant confessions. The 
first is that Crawford, like its predeceesor, had nothing to say 
about the inadmissibility of codefendant confessions under the 
Bruton doctrine, meaning that courts should find that even 
nontestimonial codefendant statements can violate the 
doctrine. The second is that Crawford deconstitutionalized the 
Bruton doctrine, meaning that nontestimonial codefendant 
statements do not violate the Confrontation Clause. In this 
case, however, courts should readily find that such 
nontestimonial codefendant statements violate Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 and are therefore inadmissible anyway. 
A. Crawford’s Testimonial/Nontestimonial Dichotomy 
Should Have Had No Effect on the Bruton Doctrine 
The first interpretation of Crawford v. Washington and 
its progeny is that they should have no effect on Bruton 
doctrine cases. If this interpretation is correct, the question of 
whether hearsay is “testimonial” or “nontestimonial” is 
irrelevant to the Bruton doctrine, and the vast majority of 
courts have erred in finding nontestimonial hearsay beyond 
Bruton’s scope. There are several reasons to believe that 
Crawford is as irrelevant as its predecessor—Ohio v. Roberts—
to the Bruton doctrine.281 
The first reason is that the Bruton opinion itself dealt 
with the inadmissibility of Evans’s confession under the rules 
of evidence, not its constitutional (un)reliability. When the 
Supreme Court decided Bruton in 1968, the Court had not yet 
addressed the question of when the prosecution’s introduction 
of hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause because it is 
constitutionally unreliable. The Court did not address this 
question until its 1970 opinion in California v. Green,282 and it 
did not clearly resolve it until its 1980 opinion in Ohio v. 
Roberts.283 The question for the Bruton Court thus was not 
whether Evans’s confession was constitutionally unreliable. 
Rather, the Court found that the confession “was clearly 
  
 281 See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. 
 282 399 U.S. 149 (1970); see Anthony Bocchino & David Sonenshein, Rule 
804(b)(6)—The Illegitimate Child of the Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule and 
Confrontation Clause, 73 MO. L. REV. 41, 56 (2008) (noting that Green was the Court’s 
“first opinion explicitly addressing the interplay of the Confrontation Clause and the 
law of hearsay”). 
 283 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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inadmissible against him under traditional rules of evidence.”284 
Evans’s confession was inadmissible against Bruton, and the 
prosecution’s introduction of the confession violated the 
Confrontation Clause because Evans did not testify and the 
confession was sufficiently harmful to Evans.285 The Bruton 
Court simply could not trust the jury to use Evans’s confession 
solely as evidence of his guilt; the confession’s admission had a 
devastating practical effect on Bruton’s defense.286 
Indeed, the Court later recognized that because Evans’s 
confession was inadmissible against Bruton, it did not need to 
resolve the issue of whether the confession was constitutionally 
unreliable. According to the Court, “[t]here is not before 
us . . . any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as 
[Bruton] is concerned and we intimate no view whatever that 
such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the 
Confrontation Clause.”287 This question of whether hearsay 
violates the Confrontation Clause because it is constitutionally 
unreliable was the question later resolved by the Court in 
Roberts and Crawford, and, as the Bruton Court made clear, it 
is a question unrelated to the doctrine it was creating.288 
Second, Crawford along with its pronounced testimonal-
nontestimonial dichotomy is also irrelevant to the Bruton 
doctrine because Cruz made clear that the Roberts test of 
constitutional (un)reliability had no effect on the Bruton 
doctrine. As noted, in Cruz, it was evident that Benjamin 
Cruz’s confession was inadmissible against Eulogio Cruz at 
their joint jury trial under the rules of evidence.289 But, 
according to the State, because Eulogio Cruz gave an 
interlocking confession, Benjamin Cruz’s confession had 
adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy the Roberts test, which 
would mean no Confrontation Clause problem.290 The Court 
forcefully rejected this argument, finding that Roberts declared 
that certain hearsay that is admissible under an exception to 
the rule against hearsay nonetheless violates the Confrontation 
Clause because it is constitutionally unreliable.291 Conversely, 
the Bruton doctrine declares that certain hearsay that is 
  
 284 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128 n.3 (1968). 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
 289 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 290 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 291 See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text. 
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inadmissible under the rules of evidence violates the 
Confrontation Clause at joint jury trials because it is harmful.292  
Thus, it was irrelevant to the Cruz Court that Eulogio 
gave an interlocking confession: 
Quite obviously, what the “interlocking” nature of the codefendant’s 
confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability: 
If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant’s own 
confession it is more likely to be true. Its reliability . . . may be 
relevant to whether the confession should (despite the lack of 
opportunity for cross-examination) be admitted as evidence against 
the defendant . . . but cannot conceivably be relevant to whether, 
assuming it cannot be admitted, the jury is likely to obey the 
instruction to disregard it, or the jury’s failure to obey is likely to be 
inconsequential.293  
The Cruz Court’s holding is unmistakable: The 
admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s 
confession that facially incriminates other defendants—but is 
inadmissible against them under the rules of evidence—
violates the Bruton doctrine and the Confrontation Clause.294 
The fact that such a confession was potentially “reliable” under 
Roberts was irrelevant to the Bruton doctrine if the confession 
was inadmissible against other defendants under the rules of 
evidence.295 Indeed, the Cruz Court noted that reliable 
confessions are often more harmful than unreliable confessions, 
implying that constitutionally reliable confessions under 
Roberts can be more violative of the Bruton doctrine than 
constitutionally unreliable confessions.296 
In fact, the Cruz Court came close to chastising the 
State for arguing that inadmissible but constitutionally reliable 
hearsay satisfied the Bruton doctrine, concluding that “[t]he 
law cannot command respect if such an inexplicable exception 
to a supposed constitutional imperative is adopted. Having 
  
 292 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 293 Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1987). 
 294 See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text. 
 295 See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text. In its later opinion in 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]o be 
admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a 
defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, 
not by reference to other evidence at trial.” 497 U.S. at 822. If the Court had applied 
this analysis in Cruz, it would not have found Benjamin Cruz’s confession reliable 
based upon the mere fact that Eulogio Cruz gave an interlocking confession. The whole 
point of Cruz, though, is that the Court did not need to resolve the issue of whether 
Benjamin’s confession was reliable because reliability was irrelevant to its decision. See 
supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text. 
 296 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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decided Bruton, we must face the honest consequences of what 
it holds.”297 And, as noted, for the Cruz Court, the honest 
consequence was that the case before it was “indistinguishable 
from Bruton with respect to those factors the Court has deemed 
relevant in this area: the likelihood that the instruction will be 
disregarded, . . . the probability that such disregard will have a 
devastating effect, . . . and the determinability of these factors 
in advance of trial.”298 
The third reason why Crawford can be read as having 
no effect on Bruton doctrine cases is that the Crawford opinion 
itself implies that the Court did not intend for its 
testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy to have any effect on the 
Bruton doctrine. Crawford claimed that the Roberts “test 
stray[ed] from the original meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause and urge[d the Court] to reconsider it.”299 The Crawford 
Court thus found that “[w]here testimonial statements are at 
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy 
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.”300 The Court later confirmed in both 
Davis and Bockting that Crawford overruled Roberts.301 
If all the Court did in Crawford was overrule Roberts, it 
is clear that the Court’s opinion had no effect on the Bruton 
doctrine because the Roberts test for constitutional reliability 
had no effect on the Bruton doctrine,302 which is solely 
concerned with constitutional harmfulness, so there is no 
reason to believe that Crawford’s replacement test for 
constitutional reliability should be any different. Indeed, the 
Crawford Court acknowledged that it was not affirmatively 
reaching the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment is only 
concerned with testimonial hearsay,303 so it would be difficult to 
argue that Crawford itself found nontestimonial hearsay 
beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine. 
That said, the Crawford Court did conduct a historical 
analysis of the Confrontation Clause, finding that it supported 
two inferences: the clause (1) covers both live testimony in 
court and “testimonial” statements and (2) does not allow for 
the admission of “testimonial” statements unless the declarant 
  
 297 Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193. 
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is “unavailable” at trial and the defendant previously had the 
chance to cross-examine him.304 The Court then found that its 
“case law ha[d] been largely consistent with these two 
principles.”305 The Court in Davis later used this historical 
analysis to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is only 
concerned with testimonial hearsay.306 The argument could be 
made, then, that regardless of the actual grounds of its prior 
Confrontation Clause precedent, going forward, only 
testimonial hearsay can violate the Confrontation Clause. 
There are, however, two separate portions of Crawford 
that contradict the reading that the testimonial/nontestimonial 
dichotomy applies to, and hence limits, the Bruton doctrine. 
First, in its historical analysis, Crawford addressed an 
important argument by the State. The State had argued that 
the admission of Sylvia Crawford’s statement to the police did 
not violate the Confrontation Clause despite the fact that she 
refused to testify because her statement interlocked with 
Michael Crawford’s own statement.307 The State began by 
noting that “[i]n Parker v. Randolph, a plurality of this Court 
determined that the ‘interlocking confessions’ of jointly tried co-
defendants were sufficiently reliable to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause.”308 The State did acknowledge that this 
opinion was later “[a]brogated by Cruz v. New York.”309 
This, however, still left the State with the Court’s 
opinion in Lee v. Illinois, which the Court later noted was the 
only decision arguably in tension with established precedent. 
As noted, the Lee Court found that the case before it was not a 
Bruton case because it did not involve the effectiveness of a 
limiting jury instruction; instead, Lee was a bench trial, and 
the judge acknowledged that he used the codefendant’s 
confession as evidence of the other defendant’s guilt.310 
Therefore, the Court had to decide whether the confession had 
indicia of reliability sufficient to satisfy Roberts.311  
The Lee Court noted that the other defendant gave a 
confession that partially interlocked with the codefendant’s 
  
 304 See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text. 
 305 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. 
 306 See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. 
 307 Brief for Respondent at 8, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 
02-9410), 2003 WL 22228001, at *8-9. 
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confession but ultimately found that the codefendant’s 
confession lacked such indicia because there were discrepancies 
between the two confessions that were neither irrelevant nor 
trivial.312 Accordingly, the Court found that there was a 
Confrontation Clause violation under Roberts because “when 
the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, 
the codefendant’s confession may not be admitted.”313 
According to the State in Crawford, “‘The logical 
inference of this statement is that when the discrepancies 
between the statements are insignificant, then the 
codefendant’s statement may be admitted’” consistent with 
Roberts.314 Under this reading of Lee, if the codefendant’s 
confession in Lee completely interlocked with the other 
defendant’s confession, the admission of the codefendant’s 
confession would not have violated the Confrontation Clause at 
the joint bench trial because the confession would have had 
adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy Roberts.315 
The Crawford Court acknowledged that this was a 
“possible inference” from the Lee opinion but found that it was 
not an “inevitable one” and declined to draw it.316 Rather, the 
Crawford Court concluded that “[i]f Lee had meant 
authoritatively to announce an exception—previously unknown 
to this Court’s jurisprudence—for interlocking confessions, it 
would not have done so in such an oblique manner.”317 The 
Court then immediately followed this conclusion with the 
following disclaimer: “Our only precedent on interlocking 
confessions had addressed the entirely different question 
whether a limiting instruction cured prejudice to codefendants 
from admitting a defendant’s own confession against him in a 
joint trial. See Parker v. Randolph . . . (plurality opinion), 
abrogated by Cruz v. New York.”318 Having rejected this 
argument, the Court was then able to conclude in the next 
sentence of its opinion that its “cases have thus remained 
faithful to the Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements 
of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where 
  
 312 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 313 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986). 
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the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”319 
According to the Court, then, Lee (which was not a 
Bruton doctrine case) was relevant to the question of whether 
its cases had remained faithful to the principle that testimonial 
hearsay can only be admitted if the declarant is unavailable 
and the defendant previously had the opportunity to cross-
examine him.320 Conversely, Randolph and Cruz, which were 
Bruton doctrine cases, were not relevant to this question but 
instead were relevant to “the entirely different question 
whether a limiting instruction cured prejudice to codefendants 
from admitting a defendant’s own confession against him in a 
joint trial.”321 The Lee Court itself had distinguished the case 
before it from Bruton: Lee was “not . . . concerned with the 
effectiveness of limiting instructions in preventing spill-over 
prejudice to a defendant when his codefendant’s confession is 
admitted against the codefendant at a joint trial.”322 
Indeed, the Court had to reach this conclusion; 
otherwise, it would have been necessary for the Court to cite 
Randolph as a case that was inconsistent with the Framers’ 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause (even though 
Randolph was only plurality opinion).323 As noted, in Randolph, 
several defendants were jointly tried before a jury, and none of 
the defendants testified at trial.324 Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court found the admission of each defendant’s confession to 
police officers admissible, despite the fact that there was no 
prior opportunity for confrontation.325 Clearly, each of these 
confessions was “testimonial”—meaning that Randolph was 
inconsistent with the Framers’ understanding if the Court 
presented the Bruton doctrine as an alternative means of 
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determining constitutional reliability. But the reason why the 
Randolph Court found the confessions admissible was not 
because they were reliable; it was because they were 
insufficiently harmful. After all, each defendant had himself 
confessed and devastated his own case.326 Randolph and the 
Court’s later opinion in Cruz make clear that the Bruton 
doctrine is not an alternative means of determining 
constitutional reliability, but rather a test for determining 
constitutional harmfulness.327 
This leads to the second relevant portion of Crawford. 
Earlier in its opinion, in explaining why it disposed of the 
adequate indicia of reliability test, the Crawford Court gave 
the following explanation and disclaimer: 
The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the 
adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of 
reliability. It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of 
assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is 
very different from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that 
make no claim to be a surrogate means of assessing reliability. For 
example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; 
it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining 
reliability.328 
As this analysis makes clear, it is equally clear that the 
Bruton doctrine does not purport to be an alternative means of 
determining reliability. The Cruz Court even noted that a 
codefendant’s incriminatory statement can become more 
harmful as it becomes more reliable.329  
In Davis and Bockting, the Court did later conclude that 
the Confrontation Clause is only concerned with testimonial 
hearsay.330 But neither of these cases involved joint jury trials 
or cited a Bruton doctrine case. Therefore, these holdings are 
not directly applicable to the Bruton doctrine.331 Moreover, the 
Davis Court reiterated its finding in Crawford that the 
testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy does not apply to the 
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doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.332 Instead, as the Court 
found in Giles v. California (after both Davis and Bockting), if a 
defendant intends to and does cause a potential witness 
against him to be unavailable at his trial, the prosecution can 
admit that witness’s testimonial hearsay without violating the 
Confrontation Clause.333 This proposition makes clear that, 
despite the Court’s absolutist language in Davis and Bockting, 
Crawford’s testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy applies only 
to Confrontation Clause cases that hinge on the constitutional 
(un)reliability of hearsay. Conversely, in cases such as 
forfeiture by wrongdoing—and, by implication, Bruton doctrine 
cases—which hinge on entirely different questions, Crawford 
should have no effect. 
This conclusion is corroborated by the previously 
mentioned Bruton doctrine cases decided by lower courts before 
Crawford. As noted, courts consistently held that the Bruton 
doctrine did not apply to bench trials.334 And, as noted, courts 
continue to reach this conclusion after Crawford, even if a 
codefendant’s confession is testimonial.335 For instance, in West 
v. Jones, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan found that the Bruton doctrine does not 
apply to bench trials in the wake of Crawford because a “[t]rial 
court[] [is] presumed to consider only properly admitted and 
relevant evidence in rendering its decision and to give no 
weight to improper testimonial evidence, which is taken under 
objection.”336 Conversely, the Bruton doctrine continues to 
preclude the admission of certain testimonial hearsay by 
codefendants at joint jury trials after Crawford.337  
This dichotomy cannot be explained in terms of 
constitutional reliability, but it can be explained in terms of 
constitutional harmfulness. Obviously, the fact that Herman 
Coleman and Anthony West were subjected to a joint bench 
trial rather than a joint jury trial did not make Coleman’s prior 
confessions to police that West and he committed the crimes 
any less testimonial or any more reliable. Therefore, if 
Crawford’s testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy applied, 
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Coleman’s confession could not have been introduced at their 
joint bench trial because West did not have the opportunity to 
cross-examine him.338  
Crawford did not apply, though, because the prosecution 
offered Coleman’s confession only against him.339 Therefore, the 
admission of Coleman’s confession could only violate the 
Confrontation Clause if it violated the Bruton doctrine. And 
Coleman’s confession could only violate the Bruton doctrine if it 
was constitutionally harmful—that is, if Coleman in effect 
became a witness against West because the trier of fact could 
not be trusted to use Coleman’s confession only as evidence of 
Coleman’s guilt.340 Because, however unrealistically,341 courts 
trust judges more than jurors in this regard, the admission of 
codefendant confessions at joint bench trials do not violate the 
Confrontation Clause, but not because they are constitutionally 
reliable under Crawford.342 
Second, as noted,343 courts before Crawford held that 
prosecutors could admit confessions by nontestifying 
codefendants as long as the names of other defendants were 
replaced with neutral pronouns.344 Also as noted,345 courts 
continue to allow this practice post-Crawford, even when 
codefendant confessions are testimonial.346 Meanwhile, 
prosecutors still cannot admit unredacted codefendant 
confessions that facially incriminate other defendants without 
violating the Bruton doctrine.347 Once again, this dichotomy 
cannot be explained in terms of constitutional reliability, but it 
can be explained in terms of constitutional harmfulness.  
  
 338 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968) (“Plainly, the 
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the Government’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since Evans did not 
take the stand. Petitioner thus was denied his constitutional right of confrontation.”). 
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A codefendant’s confession redacted to replace the other 
defendants’ names with neutral pronouns is no less testimonial 
and no more reliable than a confession admitted in its original 
form. Indeed, in a certain sense, such a confession is less 
reliable: it is not the actual confession given by the codefendant 
but rather an altered version created by the court.348 But 
according to courts, jurors are more likely to respect a jury 
instruction to use a redacted confession as evidence of only the 
confessor’s guilt.349 In its opinion in Cruz, the Court found that 
the case before it, which involved interlocking confessions, was 
“indistinguishable from Bruton with respect to those factors 
the Court has deemed relevant in this area: the likelihood that 
the instruction will be disregarded, . . . the probability that 
such disregard will have a devastating effect, . . . and the 
determinability of these facts in advance of trial.”350 Conversely, 
courts have found that cases involving sufficiently redacted 
confessions are distinguishable from Bruton because there is 
less likelihood that jurors will disregard limiting instructions.351 
On the other hand, cases with nontestimonial 
codefendant confessions are indistinguishable from Bruton 
with respect to the factors that are relevant to the Bruton 
doctrine. As noted, in Bruton, Evans confessed to a postal 
inspector that Bruton and he committed armed robbery.352 The 
Bruton Court found that the admission of Evans’s confession 
along with an instruction telling jurors only to use the 
confession as evidence of his guilt violated the Confrontation 
Clause because of the likelihood that the jury would disregard 
the jury instruction, creating a devastating effect to Bruton’s 
defense.353 Moreover, unlike with a nonfacially incriminatory 
confession,354 the Court could reach this conclusion in advance 
of trial without wondering about what evidence might be 
presented at trial. 
If Evans had made this same confession to his mother, 
brother, lover, or acquaintance, this analysis would not change. 
This is because, “[w]hether or not it is testimonial, a 
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defendant’s extrajudicial statement directly implicating a co-
defendant is equally susceptible to improper use by the jury 
against that co-defendant.”355 And if the codefendant’s 
statement is facially incriminatory, the court should equally be 
able to determine these issues before trial.356 Therefore, there is 
no sound reason for courts to find that nontestimonial 
statements fall outside the scope of the Bruton doctrine.  
B. Nontestimonial Hearsay Should Still Be Held to Violate 
a Deconstitutionalized Version of the Bruton Doctrine  
This article asserts that lower courts have erred in 
applying Bruton through a Crawford lens. These courts have 
held that the admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying 
codefendant’s nontestimonial statement that facially 
incriminates another defendant no longer violates the 
Confrontation Clause and likely does not violate any other 
constitutional provision.357 Such an interpretation, however, 
only resolves the Confrontation Clause issue, not the issue of 
whether the admission of such a nontestimonial statement 
violates the rules of evidence.  
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, along with most state 
counterparts, provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
  
 355 Thomas v. United States, 978 A.2d 1211, 1225 (D.C. 2009). 
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 357 Some have argued that courts should find that the admission of 
codefendant confessions at joint jury trials can violate the Due Process Clause based 
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Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 98 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Alternatively, I 
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resulting from formal police interrogation cannot be introduced as evidence of the guilt 
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misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”358 
Meanwhile, Federal Rule of Evidence 105 and most state 
counterparts359 provide that “[w]hen evidence which is 
admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not 
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is 
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to 
its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”360 Moreover, 
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403 indicates that “[i]n 
reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair 
prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable 
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.”361 
Finally, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 states, “If the 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an 
information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a 
defendant or the government, the court may order separate 
trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any 
other relief that justice requires.”362 
Under these Rules, it is well established that the 
introduction of evidence against a codefendant at a joint jury 
trial can violate the rules of evidence if it is inadmissible 
against other defendants.363 In such cases, the court needs to 
decide whether jurors would adhere to an instruction to use the 
evidence only against the codefendant and whether the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice to the other defendants.364  
The Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. 
Figueroa365 is instructive on this issue and strikingly similar to 
the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Bruton. In Figueroa, in 
1979, Jose Figueroa, Angel Lebron, and Ralph Acosta were 
convicted after a joint jury trial of conspiracy to possess heroin 
and possession of heroin.366 At trial, the prosecution had 
presented evidence of Acosta’s 1968 conviction for selling 
heroin, and the judge issued a specific limiting instruction that 
told jurors to use the conviction only as evidence of Acosta’s 
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guilt.367 The Second Circuit subsequently determined that this 
conviction was inadmissible and reversed Acosta’s conviction.368 
This left the Second Circuit with the question of 
whether it also needed to reverse the convictions of Figueroa 
and Lebron. According to the court, “[w]hen evidence is offered 
against one defendant in a joint trial, determination of 
admissibility against that defendant resolves only the Rule 403 
balancing as to him, i.e., that the probative value of the 
evidence in his ‘case’ is not substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice to him.”369 When that evidence also “creates a 
significant risk of prejudice to the co-defendants, a further 
issue arises as to whether the evidence is admissible in a joint 
trial, even though limited by cautionary instructions to the 
‘case’ of a single defendant.”370 
The court then noted that in some cases, “the evidence is 
admitted against one defendant, leaving the issue as to the co-
defendants to be resolved solely under the severance standards 
of Fed.R.Crim.P. 14.”371 Conversely, “other cases have viewed the 
issue solely in terms of admissibility, i.e., admissibility in a joint 
trial.”372 Because the district court allowed for the admission of 
Acosta’s conviction at the joint trial, the Second Circuit had to 
decide whether the admission of that conviction violated Rule 
403 and necessitated a new trial.373 
According to the Second Circuit, there is a spectrum of 
harm that results from the introduction of evidence admissible 
against one codefendant but inadmissible against other 
defendants.374 At one extreme is the introduction of garden-
variety, prior bad-act evidence against one codefendant, which 
the court deemed “far too tenuous to bar admissibility of 
evidence in a joint trial.”375 Conversely, “[a]t the other extreme is 
the high risk of prejudice to co-defendants when evidence of a 
defendant’s prior act, like a Bruton confession, tends to prove 
directly, or even by strong implication, that the co-defendants 
also participated in the prior act.”376 The court found that 
“[u]nlike a Bruton confession, prior act evidence is not so 
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inevitably prejudicial to co-defendants that the worth of limiting 
instructions can be totally discounted.”377 Nonetheless, the 
Second Circuit concluded that Acosta’s conviction was closer to a 
Bruton confession than traditional prior bad-act evidence and 
reversed the convictions of Figueroa and Lebron.378 The Second 
Circuit is not alone in this conclusion. Courts across the country 
at both the federal379 and state380 levels have found that evidence 
admissible against one codefendant but inadmissible against 
other defendants at a joint trial violates Rule 403 or prompts the 
need for severance under Rule 14. 
Bruton makes sense in connection with Figueroa and 
these other cases. Basically, the Bruton Court concluded that 
because codefendant confessions are at the top of the spectrum 
of harm, their admission at joint jury trials is not merely 
evidentiary error, but constitutional error if the codefendant 
does not testify at trial.381 Even a finding that Crawford indeed 
places nontestimonial hearsay beyond the scope of the Bruton 
doctrine would merely resolve the constitutional issue, not the 
underlying evidentiary issue. That is, if the admission of 
nontestimonial, facially incriminatory confessions at joint jury 
trials by nontestifying codefendants no longer violates the 
Confrontation Clause, their admission still creates a high risk 
of prejudice to other defendants because they tend to prove 
directly that the other defendants committed the charged 
crime.382 Such codefendant confession cases, then, are the 
paradigmatic cases in which courts should sever the 
defendants’ trials or find that the nontestimonial confession 
cannot be admitted consistent with Rule 403. 
Interestingly, however, litigants and courts seem to 
have missed this point in the wake of Crawford. Courts 
continue to hold that the introduction of less prejudicial 
evidence admissible against only one codefendant can violate 
Rule 403 based upon the spillover effect (i.e., the effect that 
  
 377 Id. 
 378 Id. at 946-47. 
 379 See, e.g., United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“Applying this standard to this case, we would find it unreasonable to expect that the 
jury succeeded in compartmentalizing the evidence adduced at this trial.”). 
 380 See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 909 A.2d 270, 282 (Md. 2006) (“The exclusion of 
Sabrina Rogers’s testimony against Hubbard would have remedied the situation 
caused by the joint prosecution. Maryland Rule 5-403 states the general principal that 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.”). 
 381 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 382 See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
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admission of evidence against one defendant can have on other 
defendants).383 But when presented with nontestimonial 
codefendant confessions—the most prejudicial codefendant 
evidence384—they now curtly conclude that these confessions are 
beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine and fail to conduct a 
Rule 403 or Rule 14 analysis. Indeed, in none of the previous 
cases cited in this article finding a nontestimonial codefendant 
confession beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine did the 
court address severability or admissibility under these Rules.385 
In fact, the only court to address these Rules after 
finding that nontestimonial hearsay is beyond the scope of the 
Bruton doctrine was the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
in its 2009 opinion Thomas v. United States.386 In Thomas, 
Keith Thomas and Ron Herndon were charged with “first-
degree premeditated murder while armed [as well as in] 
possession of a firearm during a crime of violence” and jointly 
tried before a jury.387 During a break in trial, Thomas was 
placed in a holding cell with Danny Winston, who was charged 
with a different murder, and told him that he was with Ron 
when Ron shot the victim.388 Thomas did not testify at trial, but 
the prosecution called Winston to testify regarding Thomas’s 
confession, with Ron Herndon’s name replaced with the neutral 
pronoun “someone.”389 
After he was convicted, Herndon appealed, claiming 
that the admission of Thomas’s confession violated the Bruton 
doctrine and the Washington, D.C., counterpart to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.390 The Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit disagreed with Herndon’s former argument, 
finding that “if a defendant’s extrajudicial statement 
inculpating a co-defendant is not testimonial, Bruton does not 
apply, because admission of the uncensored statement in 
evidence at a joint trial would not infringe the co-defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights, whether or not the statement fits 
within a hearsay exception.”391  
  
 383 See supra notes 373-80 and accompanying text. 
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 385 See supra notes 259-71 and accompanying text. 
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With regard to Herndon’s second argument, however, 
the court concluded that “[w]hether or not it is testimonial, a 
defendant’s extrajudicial statement directly implicating a co-
defendant is equally susceptible to improper use by the jury 
against that co-defendant.”392 Accordingly, the court found that 
“[a] defendant’s non-testimonial out-of-court statement 
therefore remains a candidate for redaction (or other remedial 
measures) under Criminal Rule 14 unless it fits within a 
hearsay exception rendering it admissible against the non-
declarant co-defendant.”393 Therefore, if the trial court had not 
redacted Thomas’s confession, its admission would have 
constituted potentially reversible error, but because the trial 
court replaced Herndon’s name with a neutral pronoun, there 
was no such error.394 In other words, even if nontestimonial 
hearsay is beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine after 
Crawford, courts can still find reversible error under Rule 14 or 
Rule 403 based upon “the same considerations-whether [the co-
defendant]’s extrajudicial statements (with or without excisions) 
so ‘powerfully’ incriminated [the other defendants] as to create a 
‘substantial risk’ that a reasonable jury would be unable to follow 
the court’s limiting instruction and would consider those 
statements in deciding [the other defendants’] guilt.”395 To the 
extent that defense attorneys are not arguing that the admission 
of nontestimonial codefendant confessions violates Rule 14 or 
Rule 403 as a fallback argument to the traditional 
Bruton/Confrontation Clause argument, they should now advance 
such arguments. And, as the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Thomas 
makes clear, courts should treat these rules-based arguments in 
the same way as they would Bruton-based constitutional 
arguments and find that the admission of facially incriminatory 
nontestimonial statements by codefendants constitutes 
evidentiary error unless they are sufficiently redacted.396  
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 396 Of course, if Crawford did indeed deconstitutionalize Bruton with regard to 
nontestimonial hearsay, state courts, as opposed to federal courts, would no longer be 
bound by the Supreme Court’s Bruton doctrine precedent in cases involving 
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Rule 403.  
2012] AVOIDING A CONFRONTATION? 679 
CONCLUSION 
In Cruz v. New York, the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that interlocking confessions were beyond the scope 
of the Bruton doctrine because they had adequate indicia of 
reliability to satisfy the Ohio v. Roberts test.397 In rejecting this 
argument, the Court cautioned that “[t]he law cannot command 
respect if such an inexplicable exception to a supposed 
constitutional imperative is adopted. Having decided Bruton, 
we must face the honest consequences of what it holds.”398 
By finding that nontestimonial hearsay is beyond the 
scope of the Bruton doctrine, courts have created such an 
inexplicable exception and failed to face the honest 
consequences of what Bruton holds. Like a case involving an 
interlocking confession, a case involving a nontestimonial 
confession is “indistinguishable from Bruton with respect to 
those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this area: the 
likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded, . . . the 
probability that such disregard will have a devastating 
effect, . . . and the determinability of these factors in advance of 
trial.”399 These factors do not depend to any extent on whether a 
codefendant confesses to a police officer, a confidential 
informant, a mother, a brother, a lover, or a friend. These 
latter, casual confessions are constitutionally reliable according 
to the test set forth in Crawford, but the Bruton doctrine does 
not depend upon the unreliability of codefendant confessions; it 
depends upon their constitutional harmfulness. It depends 
upon how much damage the admission of such a confession 
would cause to other defendants at trial, not upon whether the 
confessor thought that the statement would be available for use 
at a later trial. 
Moreover, even if Crawford deconstitutionalized the 
Bruton doctrine with regard to nontestimonial hearsay because 
it is constitutionally reliable, “[w]hether or not it is testimonial, 
a defendant’s extrajudicial statement directly implicating a co-
defendant is equally susceptible to improper use by the jury 
against that co-defendant.”400 Therefore, even if such confessions 
are admissible despite the Confrontation Clause, courts should 
find that their admission violates the rules of evidence. 
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